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The Use of Mediation to Resolve Community 
Disputes 
  Charles B. Craver 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Disputes arise in communities quite frequently. Neighbors may 
disagree about the precise lines separating their properties, about 
property maintenance or design, about the propriety of a fence one is 
thinking of erecting, or about a similar issue. Landlords and tenants 
may have disputes regarding their relationships. Residents in a certain 
area may have different perspectives regarding proposed changes in 
school boundaries, modifications in zoning regulations, or other such 
matters. Neighborhood disagreements can become quite personal and 
emotional, as friends begin to think they are being treated 
disrespectfully. When possible changes in school boundaries or 
zoning rules are being contemplated, residents may fight hard for the 
results they prefer. 
When neighbors and landlords and tenants are unable to resolve 
disputes amicably, they frequently resort to legal action as each 
person fights for the outcomes they desire. Individuals seeking to 
block school boundary changes or zoning modifications may even 
take legal action. Such behavior can cause irreparable harm to 
existing relationships, cost significant sums of money to everyone 
involved, and delay appropriate changes for prolonged periods of 
time. 
Disputing neighbors usually endeavor to resolve their 
disagreements through negotiations, but such interactions may fail 
due to the highly emotional issues involved. Landlords and tenants 
may encounter similar difficulties. Political leaders may similarly 
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seek to elicit the perspectives of residents before they decide to 
change school boundaries or zoning policies, but find it difficult to 
generate agreement among the different groups involved. When 
bargaining interactions do not generate mutually beneficial results, it 
can be highly beneficial for the interested parties to request the 
assistance of neutral facilitators. 
The inability of disputing parties to achieve resolutions of their 
competing interests does not mean that they would be better off with 
no agreement. Inexperienced participants may have failed to initiate 
meaningful discussions. Each side may have simply been waiting for 
the other side to raise the subject. Someone may have employed 
disingenuous tactics that discouraged their counterparts, or the 
individuals involved may have taken unyielding positions they felt 
they could not change without looking weak. Communication 
channels may have been disrupted because of the intense emotional 
issues involved. These factors may have caused the parties to ignore 
areas of potential overlap. If these bargaining deficiencies could be 
alleviated, the participants might realize that mutually beneficial 
arrangements would still be preferable to impasses. 
Some are hesitant to resort to mediation, because they think those 
sessions will be time-consuming and/or result in the imposition of 
disadvantageous terms. These concerns are unfounded. The effective 
use of conciliation can be highly cost effective, because it eliminates 
the need for protracted litigation. Parties have to appreciate the fact 
that mediators do not possess the authority to dictate agreements. 
They are merely empowered to assist parties with their own 
interactions.
1
 Neutral intervenors may enhance communication and 
help parties develop innovative alternatives they may not have 
considered. The final authority always rests with the parties 
themselves. No matter how diligently mediators work to generate 
agreements, the negotiating participants always control their own 
final destinies since they have to live with whatever they agree to 
accept.
2
 
 
 1. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 2–3 (1st ed. 1994). 
 2. See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for 
Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 75–78 (2002). 
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Disputing parties need to recognize that mediation is basically 
assisted negotiation.
3
 Conciliators employ bargaining skills to 
facilitate inter-party negotiations and to encourage the attainment of 
mutual accords.
4
 Although the bargaining process remains the same 
as it was prior to mediator intervention, the interaction becomes more 
complex due to the participation of the neutral facilitator. The parties 
are no longer simply negotiating directly with each other. They are 
negotiating with the mediator, through the mediator with each other, 
and directly with each other with conciliator assistance. Nonetheless, 
the negotiators continue to exchange ideas and proposals, as they 
were previously doing alone, and they retain control over any final 
terms agreed upon. 
Successful mediation efforts can significantly enhance the 
psychological well-being of negotiating parties. The attainment of 
mutually beneficial agreements enable them to avoid the anxiety, 
trauma, and uncertainty of litigation. In addition, they are able to 
work together to formulate their own final arrangements. This is 
almost always preferable to results imposed on individuals through 
adjudications or the political process.  
This Article will explore the ways in which mediator assistance 
may be effectively employed to resolve community disputes. It will 
first consider the different approaches used by most mediators to 
generate accords. It will then examine how parties initiate mediation 
intervention, and the importance of doing so in a timely manner. It 
will consider the types of mediators community disputants should 
select to assist them with their controversies. 
It will also discuss how negotiators and mediators should prepare 
for their interactions, and how bargaining parties and neutral 
facilitators should initially interact with one another. In addition, it 
will explore questions of what mediators should do to create 
beneficial bargaining environments and consider what techniques 
mediators should employ at initial sessions to explain the basic rules 
 
 3. See HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING IN A 
PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 67 (2004). 
 4. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26–27 (3d ed. 
2004). 
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to be followed, and to enable the participants to express their 
thoughts and feelings in hospitable environments? 
Once the substantive discussions commence, what do mediators 
do to generate mutually beneficial conversations? How do they 
induce the participants to explore innovative alternatives they may 
not have previously considered? When should conciliators 
contemplate separate caucus sessions that might help them to 
understand party concerns they might not be willing to express 
directly with one another? When might it be appropriate for 
government entities to use regulation-negotiation-mediation to 
generate final regulations that best satisfy the underlying interests of 
the competing groups involved? How might victim-offender 
mediation be employed to generate restorative justice for victim and 
decrease the likelihood of recidivism by the offenders? Finally, this 
Article considers rules mediators should follow to avoid ethical 
difficulties. 
II. MEDIATOR STYLES 
 Effective mediators generally possess a number of common 
characteristics, no matter which styles they employ.
5
 They are 
objective persons who are aware of their own potential biases. They 
have excellent communication skills. They are empathetic listeners 
and assertive speakers. They are active listeners who are adept 
readers of nonverbal signals. They generally have good interpersonal 
skills that enable them to interact well with persons from diverse 
backgrounds. They understand the negotiation process and the way in 
which they can enhance bargaining interactions. Since they lack the 
authority to impose actual terms on bargaining parties, they have to 
rely upon their powers of persuasion and their reputations for 
impartiality and fairness to help parties achieve their own mutual 
accords. 
 
 5. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MEDIATION 57–65 (Practice Law Institute) 
(2012). 
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Mediators tend to primarily employ one of three different styles.
6
 
Most are facilitative. They work to reopen blocked communication 
channels and to encourage direct inter-party negotiations that will 
enable the participants to formulate their own final terms. Some use 
an evaluative style and focus primarily on the substantive terms being 
discussed. They then endeavor to determine the provisions they think 
would be most acceptable to everyone, and they work to induce the 
participants to agree to the packages they have formulated. Finally, 
an innovative group of conciliators are transformative. They 
endeavor to empower the participants and generate mutual respect 
that will enhance the ability of disputants to resolve their own 
difficulties. These styles are not always distinct and separate. Many 
skilled mediators employ two or even all three approaches when they 
think the operative circumstances warrant such behavior. 
A. Facilitative Approach 
Facilitative mediators endeavor to regenerate party-to-party 
discussions to enable the bargaining participants to structure their 
own deals.
7
 They think that temporary impasses are caused by 
communication breakdowns and/or unrealistic expectations. They 
strive to reopen communication channels and to induce negotiators to 
reevaluate the reasonableness of their respective positions. They ask 
many questions that are designed to prompt the participants to 
reconsider their positions and to encourage the parties to explore new 
areas. Once facilitative intervenors generate meaningful bargaining 
exchanges, they let the participants decide what terms are best for 
themselves. They prefer to conduct joint sessions during which the 
parties engage in face-to-face bargaining.
8
 These neutrals rarely 
resort to separate caucus sessions, except when they encounter crisis 
 
 6. See DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 63–92 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 7. See MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, EXAMPLES & 
EXPLANATIONS: DISPUTE RESOLUTION 85–86 (2d ed. 2011). 
 8. See Carolynn Clark Camp, Mediating the Indissoluble Family: Mediator Style in 
Domestic Relations Cases, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 187, 201–02 (2012). 
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situations during which the disputing parties are unable to talk 
directly with one another in a conciliatory manner.
9
 
Communication between facilitative mediators and negotiating 
parties is designed to reestablish meaningful inter-party discussions. 
They ask questions to get participants to reassess their own positions 
and to think more openly about the positions being articulated by 
their counterparts. They almost never offer their own evaluations 
directly, but accomplish this result through the questioning process. 
Facilitative mediators are especially appreciated by skilled 
negotiators who desire minimal bargaining assistance and wish to 
control their own outcomes. Facilitative intervenors can significantly 
assist parties with ongoing business or personal relationships to 
preserve those relationships through effective problem-solving 
procedures. 
B. Evaluative Approach 
Evaluative mediators are frequently used to assist relatively 
inexperienced negotiators who have difficulty achieving their own 
agreements.
10
 These neutrals usually encounter individuals who 
either do not know how to initiate meaningful bargaining interactions 
or are unable to explore the relevant issues in a manner likely to 
generate mutual accords. As a result, these intervenors feel the need 
to control the situations they encounter. Evaluative mediators can 
also help even proficient negotiators overcome seemingly 
irreconcilable issues blocking ongoing negotiations.
11
 
Evaluative mediators like to use separate caucus sessions during 
which they explore the underlying interests of each party outside the 
presence of persons on the other side. They initially ask many 
questions designed to let them know what each side needs to achieve. 
Once they feel they have a sound understanding of the relevant terms, 
they put together packages they think will optimally serve the 
interests of everyone. They then employ a direct approach to let each 
side understand the terms they think everyone should accept. When 
 
 9. See DEBORAH KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 46–47 (1983).  
 10. See MOFFITT & SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 86–87. 
 11. See generally FREUND, supra note 5. 
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participants object to suggestions they make, these neutrals try to 
convince those persons that the proposed accord would be the best 
they could hope to achieve. Although some parties may think that 
such intervenors are trying to impose their own values on the 
negotiators, this is not correct. They work diligently to appreciate the 
different party values involved and to formulate terms they believe 
would optimally suit everyone. The agreements they propose are thus 
based entirely on the underlying interests of the bargaining 
participants. 
Negotiators who are uncertain regarding the appropriate way for 
them to achieve mutually acceptable agreements and who desire 
substantive guidance from experienced neutrals may appreciate the 
assistance provided by evaluative mediators. They should carefully 
select substantive experts who are likely to understand their particular 
interests, and work with them to craft terms that best satisfy the 
objectives of each of the parties. They must always remember, 
however, that they do not have to accept any recommendations made 
by evaluative mediators, and can continue to explore other options 
they may prefer. Parties who prefer to control their own destinies do 
not usually feel comfortable with such evaluative intervention. 
C. Transformative Approach 
In their thoughtful 1994 book, Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph 
Folger explored a novel approach to mediation.
12
 They rejected the 
traditional facilitative and evaluative mediation styles in favor of a 
more relationship-oriented approach designed to transform disputing 
parties into relatively self-sufficient problem solvers. They believe 
that many persons have difficulty negotiating with others because 
they feel they have no meaningful power to influence the bargaining 
outcomes. Individuals may also find it difficult to appreciate the 
underlying interests of the persons with whom they must deal.  
Transformative mediators strive to empower weak-feeling parties 
by demonstrating the rights and external options available to those 
 
 12. BUSH & FOLGER (1994), supra note 1. See also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH 
P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 
(rev. ed. 2005) (responding to assessments of their first book). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:231 
 
 
persons both through settlement and non-settlement alternatives. 
They also work to help the participants understand the positions taken 
by their counterparts and recognize—even if they do not accept—the 
validity of those positions. They believe that empowered individuals, 
who are aware of their non-settlement alternatives and who 
appreciate the viewpoints of their counterparts, can optimally work to 
achieve their own mutually beneficial solutions. Even when 
immediate accords are not attained during transformative 
intervention, Bush and Folger maintain that empowered parties will 
be better able to handle future bargaining interactions due to their 
new-found problem-solving skills.
13
 
Unlike facilitative and evaluative mediators who are particularly 
interested in resolutions of the underlying disputes, transformative 
conciliators are primarily interested in future party relationships. 
Even though they may be pleased when their efforts generate current 
agreements, they prefer to help disputants understand how they can 
effectively resolve their own future controversies. To accomplish this 
objective, transformative intervenors focus on two basic issues: party 
empowerment and inter-party recognition.
14
 When a party feels 
impotent, transformative mediators work to show that party that they 
possess the power to order their relationships. For example, if the 
current discussions do not prove fruitful, parties can assert their rights 
in court or do business with other parties. Transformative mediators 
simultaneously endeavor to generate inter-party empathy by inducing 
each side to appreciate the feelings and perspectives of their 
counterparts. 
The transformative style has become especially popular with 
family law specialists, who often encounter unequal relationships due 
to economic inequalities or physical or emotional abuse. The victims 
of such relationships may feel that they lack any bargaining power 
and must give in to the demands of their significant other. Good 
transformative mediators can help such persons appreciate the fact 
that they do not have to give in. They can go to court and seek fair 
 
 13. BUSH & FOLGER (2005), supra note 1, at 22–39. 
 14. Id. at 22–39; BUSH & FOLGER (1994), supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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resolutions of the underlying issues. Once they feel empowered, they 
can participate meaningfully in the facilitated discussions. 
III. INITIATING MEDIATION PROCESS 
The timing of initial mediation efforts can be critical with respect 
to community disputes. If neutral intervention begins prematurely, 
the conflicting parties may be unreceptive. They may not be 
sufficiently prepared to participate meaningfully in mediation 
sessions. On the other hand, if conciliatory efforts begin too late, the 
bargaining participants may be locked into unyielding positions that 
would be difficult for them to alter. 
When neighborhood disputes arise, the interested parties generally 
become involved rather quickly. For example, if one person decides 
to alter his or her property in a way that agitates the neighboring 
residents, and these neighbors confront the actor as soon as they learn 
of his or her plans or changes. A landlord may disagree with what a 
tenant has done to the premises, or a tenant might be upset about 
what a landlord has not done to correct a situation. These parties may 
endeavor to work out an arrangement that might be acceptable to the 
relevant persons, and their negotiations might prove fruitful. When it 
becomes clear, however, that direct discussions are unlikely to 
generate a mutually agreeable solution, expedient mediator 
intervention can be beneficial. If the parties wait too long, the most 
serious damage may be done—and can be difficult to undo. 
The selection of an appropriate neutral facilitator can be critical. 
Should the parties seek a facilitative, evaluative, or transformative 
intervenor? Should they choose someone they know from their 
neighborhood who does not have a direct interest in the issues being 
disputed or an outside neutral? If specific legal issues are involved, 
such as property borders or the legal propriety of new fencing or the 
removal of healthy trees or shrubs, it might be helpful to select an 
evaluative neutral with legal knowledge needed to help the parties 
appreciate the related law. That mediator could research the relevant 
property records, the zoning regulations, or other similar documents 
to determine the correct property line or the propriety of changes to 
existing properties. They may then feel comfortable providing the 
disputing parties with their view concerning the applicable rules. If 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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they are respected experts, the disputants might yield to their 
interpretations. 
In many cases, the legal rules are not clear. In such cases, it might 
be best to select a facilitative intervenor, who will work closely with 
the disputants to help them generate mutually acceptable final terms. 
Such intermediaries would conduct joint sessions during which they 
would encourage the disputants to negotiate with each other to 
explore their underlying interests. The neutrals would ask many 
questions designed to induce the participants to open their minds to 
various alternatives that might be mutually acceptable. 
Where some of the people involved with neighborhood 
controversies feel a lack of control over the issues in dispute, it may 
be most appropriate to seek the assistance of transformative 
mediators. This type of intervention is especially appropriate for 
highly personal controversies that generate strong emotional feelings. 
This can be quite frequent when the disputing individuals live next to 
each other. The adversely affected persons may think they have no 
recourse, and they may have extremely negative feelings toward the 
responsible actors. Although such persons would not wish to have 
evaluative mediators try to tell them what the outcomes should be, 
they would welcome assistance that focuses on ways to preserve their 
relationships. The intervenors might explore ways in which the 
adversely affected parties could seek relief through government 
departments or legal actions, in order to demonstrate that the 
dissatisfied persons actually possess some real bargaining power—
that they do not have to give in to the situations they face. These 
mediators would also work to induce the disputing parties to 
appreciate each other’s perspectives. Why is the actor contemplating 
the action in question or has already taken the action being 
challenged, and why are the neighbors so concerned about what is 
being contemplated or has been done? 
Proficient transformative mediators often help disputing neighbors 
appreciate the different interests of the people involved and induce 
them to explore innovative options that might satisfy all of their 
concerns. The initial actors might be convinced to apologize to their 
neighbors in a manner that would alleviate the overall tensions 
involved. It is much easier for the disputants to begin to work 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/13
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together in a more objective manner once the highly emotional 
atmosphere is diminished. 
IV. PARTY AND MEDIATOR PREPARATION 
Parties involved in disputes frequently fail to appreciate the fact 
that mediation is assisted negotiation. As a result, they may go to 
conciliation sessions unprepared. This lack of planning can cause 
them to be less forthcoming and less forceful. It also undermines the 
capacity of the neutral intervenors to perform their functions 
effectively. 
Parties should prepare for mediation sessions as thoroughly as 
they would for any bargaining encounter.
15
 They should be familiar 
with the relevant issues, and understand what they hope to get for 
themselves. What resolutions would they prefer over their non-
settlement options? When they consider the economic and 
psychological costs of possible litigation, they should appreciate the 
fact that compromise might be preferable to continued conflict. They 
must also have sought to place themselves in the shoes of the other 
persons involved in order to appreciate the different perspectives 
those individuals would likely bring to the bargaining table. This 
process not only enables them to have a greater understanding of 
other’s interests, but also helps them consider possible resolutions 
that might effectively satisfy the all parties’ concerns. 
Participating disputants should also endeavor to learn about the 
mediation style of the selected conciliator. Is that individual primarily 
facilitative, evaluative, or transformative? Do they tend to be active 
or passive leaders of the bargaining interaction? Will they ask general 
questions or highly specific inquiries regarding the underlying issues? 
It is important for the disputing parties to ask these questions, So that 
they are prepared to work with their mediator’s style and engage in 
an effective negotiation. 
It is similarly important for designated neutrals to prepare for their 
bargaining encounters. They should try to determine the operative 
facts and the underlying interests involved. What is it that the parties 
 
 15. See DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND 
NEUTRAL 233–64 (2d ed. 2011). 
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are disputing, and what options might be available to resolve their 
conflicting positions? When neighbors are fighting over land borders 
or zoning issues, it can be helpful for the neutral facilitators to obtain 
the relevant property descriptions or zoning regulations. Such 
information can help them plan for the way in which they should 
approach the discussions they will conduct. 
V. PRELIMINARY MEDIATOR-PARTY CONTACT AND CONDUCT OF 
INITIAL MEDIATION SESSION 
When parties first select a mediator, or when a community 
organization or government entity appoints a neutral intervenor, the 
parties either contact that person or that individual contacts them. 
This is the point at which many parties first learn about the potential 
role to be played by the mediator, and the neutral facilitator initially 
learns about the matter in dispute. It is imperative that these contacts 
be handled in a manner that avoids any appearance of partiality.
16
 
One party may telephone the mediator to inform them of their 
appointment and to schedule the first meeting. The mediator may be 
the one to initiate this process by calling the interested parties one at 
a time or by way of a conference call.  
Some mediators may feel uncomfortable discussing the issues in 
dispute with one party without the participation of the other 
participants, but experienced neutrals usually believe that such ex 
party discussions are not improper. Unlike judges or arbitrators who 
have the authority as adjudicators to impose terms on the disputing 
parties, mediators completely lack such authority. As a result, most 
feel comfortable conducting detailed talks with each party separately 
from the outset to enable them to immediately begin their learning 
process. They should inform the individuals participating in such 
separate exchanges that the information provided by such persons 
will not be shared with others involved in the controversy without 
their consent. This procedure enables mediators to learn the various 
perspectives from the relevant parties before they schedule formal 
sessions. The mediators can learn about the specific interests of each 
 
 16. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 85–101 (3d ed. rev. 2003). 
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side, and can begin to manage the expectations those parties may 
have with respect to what they hope to achieve through the mediator 
facilitated bargaining process. They can also use these separate 
exchanges to prepare the participants for the subsequent joint 
sessions by helping them to frame the underlying issues in a manner 
other participants would be likely to find appropriate and not 
offensive. 
Mediators generally prefer to conduct the initial joint session at a 
neutral location—either the mediator’s own office or at another non-
party site. They reasonably fear that if they meet at the home or office 
of one of the disputants, the other may feel intimidated or 
disrespected. Nonetheless, on some occasions disputing neighbors 
may agree to meet at the home of one of the participants simply 
because it is convenient for everyone. 
When mediators provide the location for the meeting, they should 
choose their setting carefully. An ideal meeting room has sufficient 
space to accommodate all of the participants, enough privacy to 
preclude unwanted interruptions, and ample external space for 
separate caucus sessions. The furniture should be arranged in a non-
confrontational configuration.
17
 When bargaining adversaries who 
have been unable to achieve mutual accords interact, they tend to sit 
directly across from one another in highly combative positions. They 
frequently sit with their arms folded across their chests and with their 
legs crossed—highly unreceptive postures. Such postures strongly 
suggest that they are not especially open to resolution of their conflict 
through the bargaining process. 
Neutral facilitators should endeavor to create more conciliatory 
atmospheres. Mediators should make sure the disputants initially 
shake hands and take seats that are not directly across from one 
another. A round or oval table may be used, with the mediator on one 
side and the disputants situated relatively close to each other along 
the same portion of the table. If a square or rectangular table is used, 
the parties should be encouraged to sit next to one another along the 
same side or in an “L” configuration with one along the long side and 
the other along the adjacent short side. Whenever possible, the 
 
 17. See id. at 154–56. 
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participants should be encouraged to address each other on a first 
name basis, to reinforce the informal and personal nature of the 
interaction. It is generally easier for individuals to disagree with 
impersonal opponents than personalized adversaries. The creation of 
positive environments through such efforts can increase the 
likelihood of cooperative behavior and decrease the probability of 
adversarial conduct. 
Mediators should assume control over the sessions.
18
 Someone 
must determine how the discussions are going to be conducted, and 
the neutral parties are in the best position to accomplish this. If they 
fail to assume a leadership role, the negotiations may deteriorate into 
unproductive adversarial exchanges. The establishment of mediator 
control also enhances the capacity of the neutral intervenors to 
generate discussions that would most likely raise beneficial results. 
Mediators should assume an optimistic demeanor that encourages the 
disputing parties to think of settlement as a mutually beneficial 
outcome.
19
 
Once the parties are comfortable, the mediator should explain the 
mediation process. This is especially important when inexperienced 
parties are present, as they usually are with respect to neighborhood 
disputes. The neutral intervenors should emphasize their impartiality 
and the fact they lack the authority to tell any participant what to do. 
This is important, because many individuals who participate in 
mediated discussions may feel that they lack control over the 
outcomes that may be achieved.
20
 The neutrals should emphasize that 
mediation is not a win-lose endeavor, but rather a win-win form of 
assisted negotiation. The mediators are merely present to encourage 
inter-party bargaining and to facilitate the exploration of alternative 
proposals. The parties will have the final say with respect to any 
terms that might be agreed upon. The mediator should further explain 
the use of joint sessions and the possible use of separate caucus 
sessions to promote the conciliation process. When necessary, the 
 
 18. See DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR 
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 26–27 (1996). 
 19. See id. at 77. 
 20. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A 
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 183–84 (2002). 
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mediator may articulate behavioral guidelines that will be employed 
to ensure full party participation in an orderly and constructive 
manner.
21
 
It is important for neutral facilitators to recognize that individuals 
who participate in conciliated discussions judge the fairness of those 
procedures not only by the substantive terms agreed upon but also by 
their perception of the procedural fairness involved.
22
 “The presence 
of four particular process elements result in heightened perceptions of 
procedural justice: the opportunity for disputants to express their 
‘voice,’ assurance that a third party considered what they said, and 
treatment that is both even-handed and dignified.”
23
 Mediators 
should always emphasize the fact that the disputants will have the 
opportunity to express their concerns fully in circumstances that 
guarantee careful consideration by both the other disputants and the 
neutral facilitators. They should also make it clear that the mediation 
process will be completely even-handed and conducted in a dignified 
and impartial manner. 
Confidentiality is a critical aspect of mediation endeavors so that 
the disputants can speak openly about their interests, concerns, and 
desires. If they were to think that their candid disclosures could be 
used against them in subsequent proceedings, few would be 
forthcoming and little progress could be made. This is why neutrals 
must emphasize the fact that all of the discussions conducted during 
the conciliation process will remain confidential and may not be used 
in any legal proceedings that might occur if settlements cannot be 
achieved. Confidentiality is also crucial with respect to any 
disclosures made during separate caucus with the mediator, and 
neutral facilitators should emphasize the fact that no such information 
will be shared with others without the express consent of the speakers 
involved.  
 
 21. MOORE, supra note 16, at 219–20. 
 22. See generally, Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 140–41 (2010); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 381 (2010). 
 23. Welsh, supra note 20, at 185. 
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A. Having Disputants Summarize Their Positions  
Once they have established the basic guidelines, mediators usually 
ask the parties to summarize their respective positions. Each side is 
given the opportunity to accomplish this objective free from 
counterpart interruptions.
24
 Whenever one participant objects to 
something being expressed by someone else, they are gently, but 
firmly, told that they will have the opportunity to express their own 
views once this party has finished speaking. Mediators should 
carefully listen for hidden agendas that are not being discussed, but 
will have to be addressed before mutual accords can be achieved.
25
 
Mediators need to appreciate the different types of interests being 
expressed. Some party interests will relate to the substantive issues 
that are being discussed. How do the participants seem to want the 
relevant matters resolved? Others party interests may relate to 
psychological issues underlying their emotional needs, such as a 
desire for neighborly respect or sympathy. These matters may be 
disclosed during cathartic expressions that enable the participants to 
indicate how they feel regarding the way in which they have been 
treated. 
“Active listening” is the optimal way for mediators to enhance 
party disclosures.
26
 Nonjudgmental yet empathetic interjections such 
as “I understand,” “I see,” “um hum,” etc. can be employed to 
encourage participant openness.
27
 Warm eye contact and an open 
face can also be beneficial. This approach encourages the disputants 
to openly express their underlying feelings and beliefs in a relatively 
sympathetic atmosphere.
28
 They appreciate the fact the mediator is 
actively listening to their concerns, and each party feels that the other 
participants are finally being compelled to appreciate their 
perspectives. 
 
 24. MOORE, supra note 16, at 229. 
 25. See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 42–43 (1984). 
 26. GOLANN, supra note 18, at 75–76. 
 27. MOORE, supra note 16, at 175–77. 
 28. See David A. Hoffman, Mediation, Multiple Minds, and Managing the Negotiation 
Within, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 297, 320 (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Community Disputes 247 
 
 
When emotionally-charged controversies and relationships are 
involved, as they often are with respect to neighborhood disputes, 
cathartic “venting” may dispel the tensions and emotions that are 
preventing real problem-solving and preventing the objective 
consideration of possible solutions.
29
 Mediators should allow the 
venting in an environment that is likely to minimize the creation of 
unproductive animosity.
30
 While candid feelings should be 
encouraged, intemperate personal attacks should not be tolerated. 
Participants should be helped to reframe extreme statements to make 
them more palatable to the others involved.
31
 Once all of the 
disputants have been allowed to participate fully in the cathartic 
process, they may be able to put their emotional baggage aside and 
get on with more productive discussions. On some occasions, it can 
be especially beneficial for parties who may have acted offensively to 
apologize for their conduct. A sincere apology can significantly 
reduce underlying tension and advance the substantive talks. 
B. Exploring Innovative Settlement Alternatives 
Disputants who have reached an impasse during their negotiations 
frequently focus exclusively on their own stated positions and ignore 
other possible options. None of the participants may be willing to 
suggest new alternatives, for fear of being perceived as weak. Neutral 
facilitators can significantly enhance the bargaining process by 
encouraging the parties to explore other possibilities in a non-
threatening manner under circumstances that do not require anyone to 
make overt concessions.
32
 If the way in which particular issues are 
phrased seems to impede open discussions, the mediator can either 
reframe them in a manner the disputants all find palatable or divide 
those issues into manageable subparts.
33
 
 
 29. JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
LAW 300–01 (2d ed. 2011). 
 30. PETER D. LADD, MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND EMOTIONS 35–60 (2005). 
 31. Id. at 35–37. 
 32. See generally MOORE, supra note 16, at 252–68. 
 33. Id. at 236–42. 
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Once the fundamental issues have been clearly expressed, 
mediators should work to generate an effective needs and interests 
analysis. Through the use of thoughtful inquiries, the neutral 
intervenors can induce the disputants to explore their underlying 
interests and the possible ways in which those interests might be 
satisfied. Mediator patience is vital during this stage, because it takes 
time for disputants to move from the adversarial mode to the 
cooperative mode. If neutral facilitators try to rush things, the 
disputants may dig in their heels and the problem-solving process 
may break down. Once relatively cooperative communication has 
been reestablished, conciliator silence, accompanied by supportive 
smiles and gestures, may be sufficient to encourage the parties to 
engage in meaningful bargaining. When necessary, the interjection of 
non-threatening inquiries and suggested options may be employed to 
maintain a positive brainstorming environment. 
Reasonable substitutes for articulated demands should be sought 
during these brainstorming sessions. The parties should be 
encouraged to think of options that might satisfy the underlying needs 
and interests of everyone involved.
34
 They need to engage in 
cooperative problem-solving designed to generate win-win results.
35
 
Significant issues must be distinguished from less important matters, 
and the participants must be steered to focus primarily on those topics 
that must be resolved if a final accord is to be achieved. How might 
the critical needs of each participant be satisfied by different options? 
Which alternatives acceptable to one side would least trammel the 
interests of the others? 
Joint conciliation sessions do not always move inexorably toward 
agreements. Mediators must be cognizant of those verbal and 
nonverbal signals that indicate that the joint meetings are 
approaching an irreconcilable impasse. For example, perhaps the 
participants are placing exaggerated emphasis on unyielding 
positions. They may have changed their seating arrangement from a 
cooperative setting to a more confrontational configuration. They 
may be wringing their hands and/or gnashing their teeth in utter 
 
 34. James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators and 
Empirical Studies of Persuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 328–42 (2013). 
 35. See Camp, supra note 8, at 205–06. 
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frustration regarding the lack of progress, or they have crossed their 
arms and legs in a wholly unreceptive manner. When a mediator 
perceives these negative signs, it may be time to suggest separate 
caucus sessions. 
VI. CONDUCTING SEPARATE CAUSUS SESSIONS 
Since separate encounters can only be effective when undertaken 
with the cooperation and confidence of the participants, it is best to 
ask the parties if they would be amenable to such an approach. If one 
side was really opposed to such sessions, it would be unlikely that 
they would be productive. In most instances, the participants readily 
consent to separate caucus sessions, and their commitment to this 
process enhances the likelihood of success. 
Mediators considering the use of separate sessions should explain 
at the joint session that they would like to explore the issues with 
each side individually. They should emphasize the fact that they do 
not intend to support any side. They merely wish to explore the 
underlying needs, interests, and objectives of the different 
participants in an environment that may be more conducive to candor 
than joint meetings. They must make it clear that any disclosures 
made by participants during private caucus discussions will not be 
disclosed to others, without the express consent of the persons 
involved. 
When mediators first meet with each side separately, they should 
reiterate that they will not disclose specific information provided to 
them without participant consent. They should then ask a crucial 
question: what should they know that they were unable to learn 
during the joint sessions? This question must be expressed in an open 
and non-threatening manner to encourage the desired candor. 
Disputants are frequently willing to divulge information to 
conciliators in confidence that they would be unwilling to disclose in 
the presence of the others. Mediators should avoid putting 
participants on the defensive by asking them to defend their prior 
behavior. Individuals who are asked why they have or have not done 
something may withdraw from the conciliation process. It is amazing 
how often disputants will indicate their receptivity to options that 
have not yet been explored when speaking alone with a neutral.  
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It can sometimes be beneficial to employ conditional offers to 
generate real position changes. For example, someone strongly 
objecting to an eight foot fence constructed by a neighbor between 
their homes might be asked if they might allow a shorter fence or one 
with open spaces in it. When the mediator meets with the party who 
constructed the fence, they might ask if they might be willing to 
shorten the fence or have open spaces between the posts. Someone 
who is angry about a beautiful tree or bush that was removed by a 
neighbor along the property line might be asked if they would be 
willing to replace that plant with one of their own. If they seem 
amenable to such an arrangement, the party that removed the tree or 
bush might be asked if they might assume some of the costs 
associated with such a replacement. 
Early in separate caucus sessions, it can be helpful to ask the 
participants what negative effects they associate with the settlement 
options before them. One or both parties may believe that a 
negotiated agreement on the current issues may hurt their bargaining 
position for another matter involving the same participants, or will 
adversely affect some other neighborhood relationship. For example, 
one party might fear that a realignment of the property line between 
their property and one neighbor may affect a fence they erected 
between their property and that of another neighbor, or that if they 
were to modify the trees or shrubs on one side of their property, they 
would have to do so on the other side. A landlord may fear that a 
modification of one rental unit might oblige it to make similar 
changes to other units. 
If these concerns are well founded, they will have to be addressed 
before any resolution of the immediate controversy can be generated. 
For example, this party’s other neighbors might have to be contacted 
to see whether they would like to reassess their property lines or wish 
to have this party modify their growths in a similar manner to the 
way in which they are thinking of changing the plants near the other 
neighbor. A landlord may have to ask if other tenants desire similar 
changes in their units. 
It is not unusual for mediators to conclude that the fears expressed 
by bargaining parties are unfounded. It may be unlikely that the 
property borders on the other sides of this property are incorrect, and 
there may be no need to change the trees or plants on the opposite 
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side of the house if they are modified on the immediate side. By 
thoughtfully assessing the likely consequences of bargained results in 
the instant matter, parties can alleviate the anxiety preventing a 
mutual resolution of the current difficulties.  
While meeting separately with the relevant participants, mediators 
should look for possible intra-group difficulties that might impede 
settlement discussions.
36
 Which constituencies must be satisfied 
before any agreement can be finalized? What are the underlying 
interests of the different participants, and how might they be 
addressed? Are all of the interested parties present at the bargaining 
table? If the current participants are endeavoring to alter the rules 
pertaining to gardening practices within an expanded area, the views 
of everyone who might be affected should be elicited. While some 
might be quite amenable to the changes being considered, others 
might have objections that must be addressed. If this is the first house 
in this neighborhood that would have a fence between it and a 
neighbor, would this open the door to other similar fences?  
During some separate caucus sessions, some participants may 
continue to assert wholly unreasonable demands. If mediators were to 
directly challenge those perspectives, the affected parties would be 
likely to become defensive and even more intransigent. It is usually 
more productive for the neutral facilitators to explore these positions 
in a nonthreatening manner. This can best be accomplished through 
the use of probing questions.
37
 The conciliator can explain how 
helpful it would be for them to fully comprehend the way in which 
that party has formulated its present position. They want to induce 
that person to break down their overall demand or offer components 
that must be valued on an individualized basis. 
The inquiries should initially pertain to the more finite aspects of 
that party’s position to leave them minimal room for exaggeration. 
One neighbor may claim that a fence being erected by another 
neighbor will cause the value of their property to be reduced by 
$100,000, when it would be unlikely to have an impact beyond 
 
 36. KARL A. SLAIKEU, WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
MEDIATING DISPUTES 24–25, 56–57 (1996). 
 37. JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, THE MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING CONFLICT 
SUCCESSFULLY 104–05 (2d ed. 2013). 
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$10,000. A party might be saying that a change in neighborhood 
gardening practices would cost it $5,000 to comply with, when the 
actual figure would be in the $1,500 range. An objective exploration 
of these relatively definitive costs can significantly diminish the 
expectations being expressed by such participants. 
Once the objective issues have been explored through such 
inquiries, the conciliator may have to address some subjective 
concerns. Someone might think that the view from their living room 
would be much less appealing due to what a neighbor has done or is 
thinking of doing. They might greatly exaggerate the emotional costs 
associated with such factors. If their concerns could be explored in an 
unemotional and relatively objective manner, they might calm down 
and be more receptive to options being considered. 
When disputing parties reach an impasse, they are usually 
focusing almost entirely on their area of disagreement. As a result, 
they frequently fail to consider other options where their interests 
might overlap. Mediators should look for issues in which the interests 
of the disputants are not directly opposite.
 
For example, an individual 
fighting a neighbor about a fence that neighbor wants to erect may be 
more amenable to that fence if the neighbor agrees that no tree limbs 
will be allowed to grow over the fence into the objector’s property. 
The erecting party may be perfectly willing to agree to trim any limbs 
that cross over the fence, thus alleviating this party’s concerns in this 
regard. Once issues such as this are resolved, it can become easier to 
resolve the basic question being explored. 
VII. REGULATION-NEGOTIATION-MEDIATION 
When county or municipal entities oversee particular areas, such 
as school district boundaries or zoning regulations, the adoption of 
new provisions or the amendment of existing rules can be protracted, 
contentious, and expensive. Administrative procedure statutes usually 
require publication of proposed regulations, public hearings, and 
documented agency deliberations. Once this process is completed and 
new or amended regulations are issued, adversely affected parties 
frequently seek judicial intervention. The resulting court proceedings 
may continue for several years. 
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When contentious issues are involved, the regulatory process is 
usually protracted. This is almost always true when controversial 
environmental, school boundary, or visible zoning modifications are 
involved. Some government officials have begun to recognize that it 
may be advantageous to use the negotiation process prior to the 
regulation adoption stage to avoid the need for subsequent 
administrative and judicial proceedings. Instead of merely publishing 
proposed regulations, agencies initially determine the interest groups 
most likely to be affected by the contemplated rules. Representatives 
of these different groups are then asked to participate in what has 
become known as a “regulation-negotiation proceeding”—a “reg.-
neg. proceeding” for short. 
Despite the reg.-neg. characterization, most regulation-negotiation 
proceedings are really “regulation-negotiation-mediation” 
proceedings, due to the critical participation of neutral facilitators. 
Respected neutral experts are asked to solicit the participation of the 
relevant interest groups. This process can only function effectively if 
all interest groups are adequately represented. It is thus better to err 
on the side of inclusion, rather than exclusion.
38
  
Once the diverse participant groups have been selected, the 
neutral facilitators attempt to elicit the information they need to 
determine and define the operative issues that must be addressed. 
When technical environmental or educational issues are involved, 
respected experts may be asked to provide their insights. The 
individuals selected must be viewed as wholly unbiased and 
generally acceptable among the different groups if their opinions are 
to be persuasive. 
When expansive questions must be overcome, it can be beneficial 
to appoint subcommittees comprised of representatives from each 
group. These subcommittees can focus on specific issues or narrow 
groups of issues. They endeavor to agree upon the precise problems 
that must be explored and look for mutually agreeable alternatives. It 
is especially important for the participants to explore options that 
minimize the adverse impact on any group. Even if the final terms are 
 
 38. See Molly Townes O’Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Process: 
Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 429–31 (2003). 
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not “perfect” for any constituency, provisions that are generally 
acceptable to everyone may prove more important to the overall 
success of the reg.-neg.-med. process. 
Neutral facilitators must ensure that each group’s interests receive 
thoughtful consideration. This helps to generate mutual respect 
among the different participants and is conducive to the development 
of amicable solutions. If diverse participants can be induced to 
appreciate the concerns of opposing parties, this can significantly 
reduce distrust and enhance the dispute resolution process. The use of 
a single-text approach can be especially beneficial during reg.-neg.-
med. discussions, to minimize problems that might otherwise result 
from the presence of contradictory and contentious issues. The 
neutral facilitator includes the perspectives of the different parties in 
a single document, which enables that person to control the basic 
agenda to be addressed 
Once the participants have had the opportunity to define the 
relevant issues and assess the options available to them, they must 
begin to look for common ground. Whenever possible, decisions 
should be made by consensus, rather than by majority vote. Even 
when most of the participants support a particular proposal, if a 
meaningful group is unalterably opposed to that suggestion, it may be 
able to prevent the adoption of that provision or delay the 
effectuation of that term through protracted litigation. It thus 
behooves the parties to respect the rights and interests of all 
representative groups. 
When mutually acceptable regulations or rules are drafted, they 
are recommended to the governing body for final approval. Even 
when no overall agreement can be achieved, the reg.-neg.-med. 
process may narrow the pertinent issues and induce the different 
groups to agree upon numerous factual matters. If these ideas are 
carefully considered by the governing agency during the formal rule-
making process, it decreases the likelihood of subsequent legal 
challenges by parties dissatisfied with the promulgated rules or 
regulations. Furthermore, even if litigation were to occur, a prior 
narrowing of the factual and legal issues would make the resulting 
legal proceedings more efficient. The enactment of the Negotiated 
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Rulemaking Act of 1990 encouraged federal agencies to make greater 
use of the reg.-neg.-med. Process
.39
 The basic provisions of that 
temporary statute were permanently codified in the Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.
40
 
VIII. VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 
Over the past three decades, a number of communities have 
developed victim-offender mediation programs (“V-O MED”) to help 
resolve personal theft and relatively minor assault cases.
41
 These 
programs use specially trained neutral facilitators to bring crime 
victims and their offenders together in safe environments. V-O-MED 
procedures are only employed if both the victims and the offenders 
agree to participate. 
Mediators initially communicate with the victim alone to explain 
V-O MED procedures, and to determine if the victims would feel 
comfortable meeting with the persons who harmed them. The neutral 
facilitators explain the cathartic process, which is associated with 
such programs, and the way in which the sessions will be 
conducted.
42
 The facilitators also communicate with the offenders to 
discuss how mutually beneficial it might be for them to admit their 
culpability to their victims and to explore possible ways for them to 
rectify the situations they created. 
At the joint sessions, the parties usually sit across from each other 
on the opposite sides of square or rectangular tables to provide 
victims with a reasonable sense of security.
43
 The facilitators 
carefully explain the mediation process and how the V-O MED will 
proceed. Victims are given the opportunity to express their feelings 
regarding the impact of offender actions on their personal lives. This 
 
 39. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012)). 
 40. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 
(codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584 (2012)). JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL 
AGENCY RULEMAKING 171 n.114 (4th ed. 2006). 
 41. See generally MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION 
(2001); OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM-SENSITIVE 
VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION (2000). 
 42. UMBREIT, supra note 41, at 38–40. 
 43. Id. at 23. 
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can be an especially cathartic process. Individuals who felt powerless 
when the crimes occurred now feel empowered regarding their 
capacity to express their feelings directly to the offenders.
44
 The 
offenders are given the opportunity to explore possible ways they 
might provide some restitution for the property they stole or the 
physical injuries they inflicted. If they do not have the money to 
compensate the victims, they might agree to provide personal 
services for them and/or to perform some community services.
45
 It 
can be highly restorative for offenders to apologize to the victims for 
what they did to them. 
Mediators who facilitate V-O MED sessions tend to employ the 
transformative approach.
46
 They endeavor to empower the victims to 
express their feelings openly. They also work to get offenders to 
recognize the emotional feelings of the victims—and to even get the 
victims to understand the personal circumstances that may have 
caused the offenders to do what they did.
47
 Victims who participate in 
V-O MED programs tend to feel much better than victims who 
simply see their offenders convicted in judicial proceedings due to 
the restorative justice they experience.
48
 
Once V-O MED interactions have been completed, victims 
generally feel vindicated, and plea bargaining arrangements can be 
formulated between defense counsel and prosecutors which result in 
less significant levels of punishment than would have resulted if the 
cases had gone to trial.
49
 If offenders have already pleaded guilty, or 
have been convicted, and sentences have been imposed, their 
successful participation in V-O MED sessions may enable them to 
have their penalties reduced.
50
 V-O MED programs are particularly 
beneficial where juvenile offenders are involved, because it may 
enable such individuals to modify their future behavior in a manner 
that reduces the likelihood they will become recidivists.
51
 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 42–43, 168–69. 
 46. See id. at 6–8. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See id. at 211–12. 
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IX. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
For many years, the conduct of most private mediators was 
virtually unregulated. Attorney mediators were minimally affected by 
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the more recent Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.
52
 Neutral facilitators from other 
disciplines were governed by their own ethical codes.
53
 It was 
generally recognized that while mediators might emphasize different 
aspects of proposed agreements to each side to induce them to focus 
on the terms most beneficial to each, any overt deception would 
never be appropriate.
54
 Although mediators may reframe offers 
received during separate caucus sessions to make them seem more 
palatable to the individuals on the other side, they may not 
misrepresent the true nature of such offers to deceive the offer 
recipients into believing that the offers are more generous than they 
actually are.
55
 Such deliberate deceit would destroy the integrity 
mediators require to function effectively as neutral facilitators and 
would completely undermine party respect for the mediation process. 
States did not prescribe any detailed standards for individuals who 
desired to serve as neutral intervenors.
56
 As long as particular 
individuals were acceptable to disputants, they could work as 
conciliators. Even states with basic prerequisites only required a 
minimal amount of specialized training.
57
 Although public and 
private appointing agencies usually listed only persons with 
mediation experience, it was not difficult for most applicants to 
qualify. 
By the early 1990s, the laissez-faire approach to mediator 
regulation began to change. Dispute resolution neutrals increasingly 
 
 52. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 252–55. 
 53. See id. at 250–51. 
 54. See generally John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1 (1997); Robert D. Benjamin, The Constructive Uses of Deception: Skills, Strategies, and 
Techniques of the Folkloric Trickster Figure and Their Application by Mediators, 13 
MEDIATION Q. 3 (1995).  
 55. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation of 
Mediators: Honesty, Enforcement, and Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123 (2005).  
 56. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 6, at 303.  
 57. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 
§ 11.04 (2d ed. 1994). 
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thought of themselves as part of a distinct profession, and they began 
to appreciate the need for separate professional standards.
58
 
Nonetheless, they were uncertain regarding the appropriate way in 
which to promulgate generally applicable behavioral rules and were 
concerned about the extent of regulation that should be imposed.
59
 
Finally, in 1994, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
the American Bar Association (ABA), and the Society of 
Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) adopted “The Standards 
of Conduct for Mediators” (the “Standards”).
60
 In 2005, these three 
organizations completed a three-year review process that generated 
some changes in the specific language of the different sections of 
these Standards.
61
 It is hoped that these regulations will not only 
guide the conduct of AAA, ABA, and SPIDR (now Association for 
Conflict Resolution) mediators, but also establish guidelines for state 
regulators and other private organizations that decide to promulgate 
their own restrictions.  
Standard I acknowledges the principle of party self-determination, 
not only with respect to actual outcomes, but also with regard to 
mediator selection and process design based on the belief that party 
acceptance of neutrals is essential for effective conciliation.
62
 
Standard II requires conciliators to “conduct the mediation[s] in an 
impartial manner.”
63
 Covered neutrals are required under Standard III 
“to make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether are any facts that 
a reasonable individual would consider likely to create a potential or 
actual conflict of interest” and “to disclose . . . all actual and potential 
conflicts of interests that are reasonably known to the mediator” that 
could raise questions about their impartiality.
64
 Individuals being 
considered for possible neutral appointments should inform the 
prospective participants about any financial interest they might have 
 
 58. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 447–50. 
 59. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Pluralistic 
Approach to Mediator Performance Testing and Quality Assurance, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 965 (2004).  
 60. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 6, at 304. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 305. 
 63. Id. at 305–06. 
 64. Id. 
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in any party and indicate any past or present relationships with parties 
or representative law firms that might be perceived as sources of 
possible bias. Conciliators should always resolve doubts with respect 
to possible conflicts in favor of complete disclosure. 
Standard IV, merely provides that “[a] mediator shall mediate 
only when the mediator has the necessary competence to satisfy the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.”
65
 It goes on to note that 
“[a]ny person may be selected as a mediator, provided the parties are 
satisfied with the mediator’s competence and qualifications.” No 
minimal educational or experiential prerequisites were imposed, in 
deference to party self-determination. Standard V requires mediators 
to “maintain the confidentiality of all information obtained by the 
mediator . . . unless otherwise agreed to by the parties or required by 
applicable law.”
66
 It also states that “[a] mediator who meets with 
any persons in private session during a mediation shall not convey 
directly or indirectly to any other person any information that was 
obtained during that private session without the consent of the 
disclosing person.”  
Standard VI provides that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation 
. . . in a manner that promotes diligence, timeliness, safety, presence 
of the appropriate participants, party participation, procedural 
fairness, party competency, and mutual respect among all 
participants.”
67
 This provision is designed to guarantee procedurally 
fair conciliation efforts. Under the 1994 version, conciliators were 
told to “refrain from providing professional advice,” and instructed, 
where pertinent, to suggest that parties seek their own outside 
professional assistance. This admonition was designed to avoid the 
difficulties that might be encountered if neutrals were to offer 
gratuitous advice to parties regarding the legal ramifications of 
provisions they might be considering. Although this language is no 
longer contained in the revised Standards, the admonition is implicit 
in both the self-determination and impartiality standards. 
Standard VI(A)(4) provides that “[a] mediator should promote 
honesty and candor between and among all participants, and a 
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mediator shall not knowingly misrepresent any material fact or 
circumstance in the course of a mediation.”
68
 Throughout both 
unassisted and assisted negotiations, the participants must determine 
their own legal rights through appropriate channels. Mediators should 
thus refrain from providing legal advice to particular parties. 
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that some neutral intervenors are 
willing to give their opinion with respect to controverted legal or 
factual issues. So long as they perform this function as neutral 
evaluators, and not as legal advisors to specific participants, this 
behavior would not contravene the Standards.
69
 
X. CRITICAL NATURE OF PARTY SELF-DETERMINATION 
The overall commitment to party self-determination might be read 
by some as a repudiation of the evaluative approach in which 
mediators employ more directive techniques to generate participant 
agreements. Evaluative conciliators would undoubtedly disagree with 
this interpretation, emphasizing the fact that they only become more 
directive after they have determined the needs, interests, and 
objectives of the participants. To the extent evaluative mediators 
endeavor to generate agreements consistent with party desires, their 
efforts should not be considered contrary to the self-determination 
mandate. 
Mediators should not permit the self-determination principle to 
authorize the acceptance of terms they believe to be truly 
unconscionable. Community and neighborhood negotiations 
occasionally involve parties with significant power imbalances due to 
extreme financial, emotional, or political inequalities. This 
phenomenon is especially likely with respect to certain neighborhood 
controversies involving landlords and tenants or wealthy individuals 
interacting with neighbors with far less monetary support. When 
conciliators fear that party power imbalances would be likely to 
generate unfairly one-sided agreements, they should not hesitate to 
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and indicate that they do not represent any party. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Community Disputes 261 
 
 
advise the weaker participants to obtain legal assistance. If financial 
constraints would preclude the retention of paid counsel, the 
individuals could be referred to legal aid organizations or appropriate 
public interest groups. They could also follow the practice of 
transformative mediators and point out to weaker parties their right to 
seek appropriate relief through judicial or political entities. If these 
suggestions were ignored and the neutral intervenors feared they 
would be used by the stronger parties to obtain unconscionable terms, 
they could exercise their right to withdraw from the negotiations. In 
most instances, the very participation of detached mediators should 
act as a moderating influence that should discourage the negotiation 
of wholly one-sided agreements.
70
 
XI. CONCLUSION 
When neighbors have disputes regarding property borders or 
gardening plans, landlords and tenants encounter difficulties, or 
different groups disagree over proposed changes in school boundaries 
or zoning or environmental regulations, the assistance of neutral 
facilitators can be highly beneficial. The disputing parties should 
decide whether they prefer neutrals who are primarily facilitative, 
evaluative, or transformative. Individuals who feel comfortable with 
bargaining encounters may prefer facilitative mediators, while 
persons lacking such skills may prefer evaluative mediators. People 
who feel they lack the power to interact effectively with their 
economically or politically powerful neighbors or landlords may 
prefer the transformative style. 
The parties and the designated neutrals must prepare thoroughly 
for their interactions, in recognition of the fact that mediation is 
nothing more than assisted negotiation. The designated neutrals must 
schedule meetings in settings that will not appear to favor any 
participants. At the initial session, they must explain their neutral role 
and the confidential nature of the mediation process. They should 
then elicit party positions and feelings in an empathetic manner. They 
should encourage the participants to explore ways in which the 
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disputed issues might be beneficially resolved. When the participants 
seem to be moving toward impasses, separate caucus sessions might 
be employed to regenerate stalled talks. 
When issues such as school boundaries or zoning modifications 
are involved, the use of regulation-negotiation-mediation procedures 
might be employed to elicit the views of all interested parties and to 
generate the most acceptable regulations. These reg.-neg.-med. 
efforts can avoid the costly and protracted litigation, which might 
follow the adoption of changes if they have not been jointly 
formulated. 
Individuals who have been adversely affected by criminal 
behavior may be asked if they would be willing to participate in 
victim-offender mediation programs. Effective programs can help to 
generate greater victim-offender understanding and result in joint 
feelings of restorative justice for both the victims and the offenders. 
Designated neutrals must conform to basic ethical standards. They 
must avoid any possible conflicts of interest, respect party self-
determination, and conduct their sessions in a professional and fair-
minded manner. This would best enable the participants to generate 
resolutions they feel comfortable to accept. 
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